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Introduction
Politically, the twentieth century in China has been seen as a centuryof wars and revolutions, except, perhaps, the last decade. Correspond-ingly, modern Chinese literature channelling the deep-rooted human
desires and anxieties of the century created richly variegated and imagina-
tive works of fiction, of which realism was long regarded as the dominant
genre and style by literary historians inside China and abroad. This view has
been challenged since scholars endeavoured to break the rigid political bar-
rier demarcating the May Fourth period from its immediately preceding
decades. Perry Link is a pioneer in this direction, publishing his study on
early twentieth century urban literature in 1981. (1) The studies on modern
Chinese narratology by Chen Pingyuan and Henry Y. H. Zhao, Xiaobing Tang’s
work on Liang Qichao, and David Der-wei Wang’s literary excavation of the
late Qing splendour all contributed to renewing scholarly interest beyond
the discourse of realism. (2) Since then, one work that used to be dismissively
regarded but can no longer be ignored by anyone working in the modern
Chinese literature field is Liang Qichao’s unfinished futuristic novel, Future
of New China (Xin Zhongguo weilai ji 新中國未來記, 1902). Its global scope
and nationalistic optimism pioneered the signature spirit that infused much
of the revolutionary and developmental decades up to the present time.
Political, utopian, and science-fictional, the novel is now viewed as a pro-
totype of the non-realistic schools in the modern Chinese narrative tradi-
tion. 
On the other hand, considering historical context in a global setting, we
must admit that Liang’s novel belongs specifically to his own age. Before
the Great War in Europe in the late 1910s, there was a period of rapid in-
dustrialisation stimulated by scientific discoveries, technological innova-
tions, and world-wide competitive expansion of capitalism. This was
accompanied by increasing nationalism around the world, and ambitious
aspirations fuelled by confidence in humanity’s ability to master both na-
ture and human affairs. In the West, a leading representative writer of this
conviction is Jules Verne, whose numerous works of science fiction, adven-
turers’ tales, and nationalistic thrillers were permeated with confidence in
humanity. An equally imaginative while somewhat sceptical voice was H.
G. Wells, but his critical edge was not perceptively appreciated in China. Fic-
tional works imagining a future reality in the late Qing period are generally
set in positive tones and usually with tangible fascination with future sci-
entific potential, as clearly manifested in Liang’s novel as well as in, for ex-
ample, New Year’s Dream (Xinnian meng 新年夢, 1904) by Cai Yuanpei, and
New Story of the Stone (Xin shitou ji 新石頭記, 1908) by Wu Woyao.
The worldwide trend suffered an abrupt setback in the interwar period of
the 1920s and 1930s. Confidence in the ethical value of scientific knowledge
and human social design was seriously challenged in works such as the early
Soviet writer Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1921) and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New
World (1932), and in the post-war period by George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four (1949), all regarded as classics in the broadly defined genre of
dystopia literature with some science fiction features. In China, Liang Qichao
himself became disillusioned with the blind worship of science and nation-
alism when he visited Europe at the end of the WWI, which led him into
the famous debate of “Science versus Metaphysics” in 1923. (3) But by now
Liang expressed himself through travelogues and commentaries and was
no longer writing novels. In fictional form, it was Lao She’s The City of Cats
(Mao cheng ji 貓城記, 1932) that satirised fake confidence carrying ubiqui-
tous banners promoting all things “new.” The Cat City’s final demise in an
almost self-inflicted disastrous military confrontation was so dark that the
theme was not revisited by mainland Chinese writers until the early 1990s. 
However, neither Liang’s position in the 1920s nor Lao She’s The City of
Cats was highly regarded by cultural reformers or revolutionary elites for
decades to come. Supported by scientific claims, grand utopian visions re-
jected opposition. This was particularly true when the Communist Party
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came to power in 1949, persecuting large numbers of people for straying
from its version of Grand Utopia. Henry H. Y. Zhao suggests that the reason
realism dominated fiction writing for more than half a century after the
late 1910s is most likely because the need to imagine future potential un-
certainty was replaced by faith in a future certainty. “The separation be-
tween the utopia and the reality had to be scaled with power [or
revolutionary forces before seizing power] but not imagination.” Half a cen-
tury later, when the end of the Cultural Revolution signalled the collapse of
the official version of Grand Utopia, it was time for utopian fiction to re-
emerge. (4) Zhao believes that utopian imagination was already widely pres-
ent in the root-seeking literature of the mid-eighties, but its projected
location was usually spatially separated from reality. The fiction of the future
of temporal imagination did not appear until the nineties, when “mono-di-
mensional history” ended in China. (5) However, Zhao does not further ex-
plain his observation or pursue his argument in the periodisation. The current
study aims to bring out the historical context of political utopian/dystopian
fiction in contemporary China through reading two works from the early
1990s and the early twenty-first century. 
Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril (Huanghuo 黃禍) was first published anony-
mously in Hong Kong in 1991, a mere two years after the crackdown on
the Tiananmen protests and half a year before Deng Xiaoping’s Southern
Tour revived the Chinese economy. Yellow Peril begins with severe power
struggles manipulating the redress of the Tiananmen Massacre and weaves
China’s internal conflicts into a full-fledged nuclear world war. It ends with
a bifurcated outcome of the disaster. On the one hand, resource exhaustion
has turned human beings into beasts and has completely erased all traces
of civilisation inside China’s territory. On the other hand, hundreds of mil-
lions of destitute refugees, crossing oceans and continents around the world,
have learned to organise themselves according to the program of bottom-
up gradational election, which allows them to live collectively in a self-dis-
ciplined manner and cooperative spirit so they can survive off the very
limited resources the Earth is able to provide. (6)
When Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years (literally, Prosperity: China in 2013,
Shengshi: Zhongguo 2013 盛世：中國 2013) was published in 2009, China
had hosted the 2008 Beijing Olympics with great fanfare and celebrated
the PRC’s sixtieth anniversary, a particularly important number in Chinese
culture. Imagining an almost universal acceptance of the status quo, the
novel follows a few restless souls who are isolated in a sea of happy masses.
They eventually join force to uncover the truth of dark political designs.
With rich literary references, the novel also allows its characters to ponder
philosophical issues, exploring along the way the social and global implica-
tions of China’s ascendance to superpower status. (7)
I would argue that the re-emergence of political fiction about the future
of China, represented by Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril, responded on the one
hand to the country’s struggle for direction following the bloody quelling
of the Tiananmen protests that wiped out collective idealism of the 1980s.
On the other hand, it recognised in its own way the invalidated state of a
teleological Grand Narrative that supposedly guided all human societies on
Earth. At the closing moment of the Cold War, it was time to reconsider the
purpose and organising principles of human society for the good of Mankind
as a whole. In the twenty-first century, however, developmental discourse
seems to be the footing for most of the noisy exclamations in China and in
many other places around the world. Correspondingly, fiction of the future
such as The Fat Years responds to a seemingly stabilised order that depresses
serious intellectual engagement in crucial issues concerning memories of
the past and visions of humanity’s collective future. The future is bound to
history once again, and old Enlightenment questions concerning emanci-
pation, freedom, and progress have re-emerged, urgently appealing for at-
tention.
Wang Lixiong and Chan Koonchung are not career writers in the conven-
tional sense, or at least in the Chinese context, as neither is a member of
the official Chinese Writers’ Association (Wang renounced his membership
in 2001). In addition to writing fiction, they are both well-known cultural
figures and are actively involved in many socio-political issues, such as en-
vironmental, ethnic, and regional politics in Tibet, the Uyghurs of Xinjiang,
or Hong Kong. Their political novels appear to be in line with their political
involvement in general and are not confined to merely literary exercises. In
a similar vein, they have both written books of socio-political analyses as
publicly concerned intellectuals rather than as specially trained scholars.
Yet, as we shall see later, their novels are not mere vehicles for political
messages, either. 
In comparison, Wang Shuo, the popular novelist, screenwriter, and pro-
ducer, and Mo Yan, the Nobel laureate in literature (2012), each produced
satiric dystopian parables of their own, Wang Shuo’s Please Don’t Call me
Human (Qianwan bie ba wo dang ren 千萬別把我當人, 1989) and Mo Yan’s
The Republic of Wine (Jiu guo 酒國, 1992). (8) These satires take a local per-
spective to expose the depth of social disintegration and pervasive decay,
a society corrupted under the pressure of wholesale economic marketisa-
tion with little or no moral restraints. These two novels experienced some
temporary difficulty with the authorities in the 1990s but were “rehabili-
tated” later. A more specifically political novel is Li Jie’s The End of the Red
Chinese Dynasty (Zhongnanhai zuihou de douzheng 中南海最後的鬥爭,1999),
and another daring depiction of a socially engineered authoritarian dystopia
is Sheng Keyi’s Death Fugue (Siwang fuge 死亡賦格, 2013). Neither has been
allowed to be published in mainland China in book form yet. For these four
authors, writing in various styles of social satire, political thriller, or
dystopian fiction is part of their writer’s vocation. They remain primarily ei-
ther writers or writer-scholars. (9) Venturing into writing on political topics
is exceptional in their writing career. 
For Wang Lixiong and Chan Koonchung, to a certain extent, venturing into
literature is only part of their public activities. Because of the political as-
pects of their work, Wang’s Yellow Peril and Chan’s The Fat Years have been
grouped together with Li Jie’s political thriller, mentioned above, in discus-
4. Henry Y. H. Zhao, “A Fearful Symmetry: The Novel of the Future in Twentieth-Century China,” Bul-
letin of SOAS, Vol. 66, 2003, pp. 456-471. 
5. Ibid., p. 470.
6. Bao-mi (Wang Lixiong), Huang Huo (Yellow Peril), Hong Kong, Canada Mirror Books, 1991. Wang
Lixiong made revisions later. A noticeable change was to replace the USSR with Russia. See in
English, Wang Lixiong, China Tidal Wave, translated by Anton Platero, Kent (UK), Global Oriental,
2008. Hereafter it is referred to as Yellow Peril, unless otherwise noted. 
7. Chan Koonchung, Shengshi: Zhongguo 2013 (Prosperity: China in 2013), Hong Kong, Niujin daxue
chubanshe, 2009. In English, The Fat Years, translated by Michael S. Duke, with a Preface by Julia
Lovell, London, Doubleday, 2011. Chan’s name in pinyin is Chen Guanzhong. Hereafter this novel
is referred to as The Fat Years. 
8. Wang Shuo’s novel was initially serialised in three issues of the Nanjing-based bimonthly Zhong-
shan in late 1989. It was published in book form a few years later. Mo Yan’s novel was published
in Taiwan in 1992 and in the mainland in 1993. Both were translated into English by Howard
Goldblatt and published, in Wang Shuo’s case, in London by No Exit Press in 2000; and in Mo
Yan’s, in New York by Arcade Publishing in 2000. 
9. Li Jie, Zhongnanhai zuihou de douzheng (The End of the Red Chinese Dynasty), Hong Kong, Canada
Mirror Books, 1999 (in Chinese only). Li was already a noted literary scholar in the 1980s. He is
now a New York-based writer-scholar with novels and literary criticism published inside the main-
land. Sheng Keyi, Siwang fuge (Death Fugue), Taipei, INK Publishing, 2013. The title is a tribute to
Paul Celan’s poetry. It has not been authorised for publication in book form inside the mainland. 
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sions of the similarities among these writers’ imagination of China’s political
future. (10) However, reading Wang and Chan for their political interpretation
alone may miss their broader concerns. For example, both of them devel-
oped strong environmental awareness much earlier than most of their con-
temporaries. In Yellow Peril, Wang presents environmental issues
prominently, letting his characters argue and experiment based on his strong
convictions regarding ecological security. Three years after publishing the
novel, Wang became a founding member of Friends of Nature (Ziran zhi
you 自然之友), one of mainland China’s earliest environmental groups (he
was forced to resign from the group under government pressure in 2001).
Likewise, Chan founded the Green Power group in Hong Kong and was once
a member of Greenpeace’s International Board of Directors. Their deliberate
insistence on intellectual independence is also reflected in their shared con-
cern with the situation in Tibet. Wang has published books on Tibet and its
political fate, while Chan’s second novel, published in 2013, has a Tibetan
boy as its protagonist. (11) Both writers are highly critical of Beijing’s Tibet
policy, considering it detrimental to Tibet’s people, culture, and natural en-
vironment. 
But the similarity between the two authors may stop here. Yellow Peril
was published almost two decades before The Fat Years came out. During
this period, China’s socio-political landscape in the global context trans-
formed dramatically alongside, or because of, the country’s rapid economic
growth. I shall now turn to Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril in the next section,
with Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years discussed after that.
Yellow Peril: Heroic disaster and hope in
primitive conditions
Wang Lixiong was born in Changchun in China’s north-eastern Jilin
Province in 1953. He grew up in the large compound of China’s first au-
tomaker, which was built with Soviet aide. Wang’s father was trained in
Moscow in the 1950s and later appointed a top leader of the company. (12)
Wang Lixiong attended a boarding school for children of Party cadres. When
the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, he travelled throughout China
during the “great link-up” of the initial, chaotic months, proudly taking part
in “revolutionary” debates and actions. When his parents were detained and
his father died under political persecution in 1968, Wang was left to fend
for the survival of his younger brother and himself. The experience gave him
a strong tendency toward independence. Moreover, the majority of his co-
hort consisted of youngsters who “thought of themselves as a future
Napoleon or Lenin, or at least a future prime minister.” To prepare them-
selves for the future, he recalls later, they “devoured whatever books seemed
important and debated day and night over issues concerning world revolu-
tion, international politics, and future wars.” (13) In addition, they were en-
thusiasts of classical music and literature, reading Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Victor
Hugo and writing their own poetry. Four years in the countryside as a sent-
down youth became a window for him to better understand “China.” An-
swering the century-old question “Where should China go?” became a
calling that helped him survive the ugliness of injustice, betrayal, violence,
and human evil in the decade-long political upheaval. (14)
After studying automobile design in college, Wang returned to the same
auto-making conglomerate where his father had worked and died. The ide-
alistic spirit of his youth found new channels in the late seventies when the
Reform Era came. He began fiction writing and volunteered to be transferred
to another automotive base in central China. There he started writing down
his political plan of a gradational democratisation of the electoral system.
He quit his job to become an independent writer in 1980. Four years later,
he spent two months traversing 1,200 kilometres of the uppermost stretch
of the Yellow River in the Tibetan regions of Qinghai and Gansu provinces.
A diary of the adventure recorded some crucial thoughts drifting through
his mind, especially about the meaning of human life and society, about
human beings and nature, and about various cultural traditions with differ-
ent ethnic origins. These ideas, together with his electoral plan, continued
to inform his later writing and activism, including his novels, his environ-
mentalism, and his interest in Tibet and other ethnic regions. (15)
Wang Lixiong wrote largely literary works in the 1980s. He was recognised
with literary prizes and by becoming a member of the Chinese Writers’ As-
sociation. Things changed for him decisively in the 1990s (or perhaps even
in the late 1980s). After publishing Yellow Peril anonymously abroad, he
stopped writing fiction. A sense of urgency against upcoming crisis informed
this novel and his subsequent endeavours. (16) He devoted his energies to
intellectually-guided action and analysis, focusing not only on creating a
new electoral system, but also on environmentalism, as he joined in found-
ing Friends of Nature. His attention soon shifted to ethnic issues, especially
Tibet and the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. (17) It was not until two decades after Yel-
low Peril’s publication that he returned to fiction once again, announcing
in May 2013 that he had spent two years writing and had now completed
the first draft of a political fantasy, Reincarnation (Zhuanshi 轉世). (18)
In addition to the above summary of his life experience, two striking fea-
tures accompanied Wang Lixiong’s intellectual trajectory since the late
1970s. The first is a lasting obsession with his electoral plan for “gradational
democracy” (dijin minzhu 遞進民主; zhuji dixuan zhi 逐級遞選制), which he
once self-mockingly compared to some people’s obsession with perpetual
motion machinery. (19) The other, related to this metaphor, is a deeply rooted
fascination with technology. Over the course of more than ten years, he es-
tablished his own websites, each with his electoral proposal as a central
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theme. On his latest site, entitled “Ethnic Dialogue and New Media” (Zuqun
duihua yu xin meiti 族群對話與新媒體), he initiated an online dialogue be-
tween Chinese netizens and the Dalai Lama, whom he has met several times
while travelling outside of China. Of interest to our discussion is the subtitle
of the website: “On the Internet, [Let’s] Transform Utopia into Reality (Zai
hulianwang shang, ba wutuobang biancheng you-tuo-bang 在互聯網上,
把烏托邦變成有托邦), and the prominent positioning of his electoral pro-
posal. (20) The confidence in these words seems contradictory to his ex-
pressed pessimism about China’s future, but is very much in line with his
long-term thinking. 
It is on this website that Wang Lixiong began serialising his new novel,
Reincarnation, in May 2013. However, the uploading was slow and stopped
in August 2014. (21) If the novel is going to be about 500,000 characters in
length, as Wang announced in his “Preface (Qianyan 前言)” to Reincarna-
tion, there was only about one-tenth available online by mid-2014. It is
therefore impossible to give a proper reading of this new novel. However,
as Wang makes reference to Yellow Peril in relation to all the main charac-
ters, who appear in both novels but engage in different actions and have
different fates in two very different settings, the existing parts of Reincar-
nation, including the “Preface,” are helpful to our analysis of Yellow Peril. 
The bedrock, so to speak, of Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril is the challenge
that population explosion poses to the limited resources our earth is able
to provide, a hot topic among young intellectuals of the 1980s. (22) Launch-
ing the Reform Era was a step into untested water accompanied by excite-
ment but also a sense of urgency. Prophesying immanent crises was a
common intellectual exercise in those years. Translated futurist works such
as Limits to Growth, the 1972 report by the Club of Rome, published in
1984 among the earliest titles in the influential Advancing to the Future
book series (Zouxiang weilai congshu 走向未來叢書), were extremely pop-
ular. From this perspective, Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril can almost be seen
as a graphic illustration of a doomsday prediction. As the story unfolds, we
see that a root cause of social conflict is the fight for limited resources. The
absolute size of China’s population means that a crisis of this scale is un-
fathomable to the world (pp. 457-64). When the food supply becomes
scarce, it is the end of human civilisation. In the last part of the novel, the
reader reads page after page of sickening depictions of human beings re-
duced to greedy beasts under the pressure to survive. The only things they
still care about are consumption and reproduction (e.g. pp. 626-40). “The
Globe was revolving backwards, back to the bleak desolation of the Creta-
ceous Period.” (China Tidal Wave, p. 524)
Critics have summarised the novel in various ways, usually identifying Shi
Ge as the protagonist, who, with a modest demeanour and coming from a
think-tank background affiliated with the central government, becomes Pre-
mier after the Chinese military and other top politicians are crushed in an
escalating international intervention. (23) Shi Ge indeed plays a central role
in the novel’s construction. His secret project to push nearly a billion Chi-
nese refugees across oceans and borders onto other continents contributes
directly to the full-fledged nuclear war between the United States and the
USSR. Meanwhile, a subplot involving Shi Ge in a love triangle runs through-
out the novel. The woman scientist Chen Pan ultimately leaves the ambi-
tious environmentalist Ouyang Zhonghua for Shi Ge in a contest between
two proposals to save mankind for future good, symbolising a central theme
of the novel. 
However, to single out Shi Ge could be misleading in reading the novel.
The main body of the novel, the first 400 or so pages out of 643 in the Chi-
nese original, relates the intense dramas leading to the international inter-
vention and has the love-triangle trio mainly on the waiting bench. The cen-
tral hero of this part is Wang Feng, a “red princeling” in his forties who is
strategically positioned in the central military leadership. He is responsible
for making almost all the major decisions that lead to the final disaster,
from assassinating the Party Secretary-general and secretly building a nu-
clear submarine, to launching a south-north civil war and firing the initial
nuclear missile at Taipei, setting off a chain-reaction that clears the stage
for the novel’s final part. Accompanying this line is Li Keming, an experi-
enced local police officer whose professional excellence and heroic spirit
bring him into several critical moments, fighting first against Wang Feng’s
conspiracies and then against Taiwanese revenge plots, and finally against
a Russian plan to poison hundreds of millions of Chinese refugees, before
he is killed by the combination of a Japanese trap and Russian bullets. Undis-
turbed by Shi Ge’s concern about limited resource and Ouyang Zhonghua’s
dream of a green future, episodes in this storyline are filled with cold-
blooded violence and calculating political intrigue and are written in a
thriller style, often with cinematic pace and effect. It is also in the first two-
thirds of the novel that the author captures an array of characters among
the PRC political and military elite. The pointed sketches are often rich in
insightful characterisation, presenting to readers of PRC background with a
convincing dramatisation from an insider’s view. This, I believe, constitutes
one of the main appeals of Yellow Peril. 
Although Wang Feng almost singlehandedly pulls China and the world
into massive catastrophe, and although Ouyang Zhonghua fails his own
high-minded ideals and ultimately behaves no less barbarously than those
men-turned-beasts, it is important to recognise that neither is presented
as a caricature “villain” in the novel. More than 20 years later, in his “Preface”
to Reincarnation, Wang Lixiong says:
Characters I depict are usually not those spineless persons being car-
ried around by fate. They not only struggle to control their own fate,
but try to affect the fate of their society as well. I prefer to portray
characters with such personalities. I see in them the hope of guiding
China forward and avoiding [the kind of future presented in] Yellow
Peril. People of this sort are unusual and few in number. The majority
of people in the world live only for themselves. It is this tiny minority
alone who live to change history. And our present age falls at the
exact juncture when history is due for a major reshuffle. (24)
Close reading indicates that, besides Shi Ge and Chen Pan, the other main
characters all belong to this tiny minority, especially Wang Feng, who is one
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viewed on Woeser’s website on 23 November 2014.
22. All page references given in parentheses in this section are from Wang Lixiong, Yellow Peril, op.
cit., unless indicated as coming from Wang Lixiong, China Tidal Wave, op. cit. 
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of the most positive portrayals of a “red princeling” in contemporary Chinese
literature. Handsome, ambitious, fascinated with technology, strictly precise,
and always composed, Wang Feng is neither corrupt nor blindly egoistical,
but is mainly motivated by honour and duty. Even Shi Ge recognises Wang
Feng’s noble spirit (p. 586), which shines in the direst circumstance and ter-
rifies a lowly vagabond (pp. 602-3). In a fleeting moment of emotion, he
sighs that he has lost his youthful ideal of becoming China’s Napoleon, but
this is the moment when China will not survive without one and he has to
respond to his calling (p. 391). Honour and duty, in the form of historical
responsibility, have nothing to do with the Party and its traditional ideology
but rather with the nation and the army he is obliged to serve with absolute
loyalty. Here is how he handles the power transfer to the USA and USSR
after China comes under nuclear attack by the two superpowers:
Wang Feng looked very distinguished, tall and straight, the sun on
him, as he came down the steps with great dignity. The two ambas-
sadors stood side by side with smiles that did not even crease their
faces, and stretched out their hands. Wang Feng looked closely at
the two faces, slowly stretched out his hand and said,
“I don’t see your Presidents, only their representatives…” Then he
suddenly slapped their faces, so hard that they fell down on the red
carpet, bleeding from nose and mouth. 
The band continued to play the Chinese national anthem and the
flag of China with its five stars fluttered in the wind. All the soldiers
continued to stand to attention and salute. The two men made an
effort to stand up and regain their dignity, but they were dizzy and
could not keep their feet. 
Wang Feng looked at them until the last strains of the national an-
them died away. An orderly handed him a white towel; he wiped his
hands, as if after a banquet, and threw it down at the feet of the two
ambassadors. Then he saluted all the officers and under their aston-
ished and admiring eyes, went back into the headquarters.
(China Tidal Wave, p. 352). 
Comparatively, Ouyang Zhonghua is also “born to be extraordinarily great
man” (p. 613) but with greater intellectual orientation. He preaches an aes-
thetic philosophy of spiritually fulfilled human life in an environmental-
friendly green lifestyle. His internationally acclaimed book is entitled The
Spiritual Man (Jingshen ren 精神人; p. 42; pp. 74-78), a term that Wang 
Lixiong himself pondered while drifting down the Yellow River in 1984.
Ouyang’s personal background also shares some features with Wang 
Lixiong’s own. However, for Ouyang, the only way to realise his grand ideal
on earth is to rewire human civilisation from zero. To prepare for this, he
obtains financial support from Shi Ge to transform several national parks
in obscure locations into survival bases. These enable him to establish a
powerful network in time of crisis, with which he manages to save as many
scientists and artists as possible from a “nuclear winter” for purposes of fu-
ture reconstruction. He is obliged to block the poor masses from entering
his base, often through the resolute use of violence. As a result, he also has
to deal with the “wrong” impression of “might is right” within his militia
team, which soon turns against him, and he himself has to kill in order to
preserve his base and himself. This causes him painful self-doubt in the end. 
As noted earlier, the novel’s structural setting assigns different narrative
functions to its heroes. The first, larger portion of the story inhabited by
Wang Feng sees scarcity of resources threatening China and her people, but
that problem alone could not have pulled the country into crisis. This is a
primarily world of coincidence and personality clash. It is along this line
that Wang Lixiong issues his prediction of China falling into a downward
spiral and his critique of the modern world with its unbridled consumption
and dangerous curiosity (e.g., towards nuclear weapons). 
Ouyang Zhonghua, on the other hand, encounters his ultimate challenge
in the second, shorter portion of the novel at a stage at which his green
proposal, brought to ruin by the internal contradictions mentioned above,
is unfavourably contrasted with Shi Ge’s gradational electoral system 
(pp. 423-25), Wang Lixiong’s pet project in the novel. Similarly unfavourably
contrasted is American democracy, regarded as the least efficient and driven
by mindless and volatile mass reaction that is unable to handle crisis on a
global scale (pp. 571-77). For Wang Lixiong, as for H. G. Wells, the key con-
dition for a contest of utopian visions is a global catastrophe. (25) The flood
of Chinese refugees, the Yellow Peril, brings the new possibility of a global
society. The modern state, national borders, political parties, armies, banks,
capital, market, even currency for the exchange of goods, have all disap-
peared. People have learned to restrain their needs and to work collectively.
“Although people were still struggling for survival from starvation and death,
they came closer than at any other time to the kinds of society that
mankind has always dreamed of” (China Tidal Wave, p. 511). A catastrophe
becomes a catalyst for a primitive Utopia for humankind on Earth. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully assess Wang Lixiong’s socio-
political utopian proposal. Here are a few quick notes on his gradational
election of a centralised power-sharing system. First, despite Wang’s re-
peated emphasis on bottom-up elections to guarantee voter will, the sys-
tem’s graduated levels of expertise ensure socio-political hierarchy without
considering the impact on social equality. Second, even when a disastrous
situation reduces people to focusing on basic needs and so provides the
best conditions to institute the system, it has to be “installed” or instilled
top-down into the minds of the masses by an existing elite. In this regard,
there is no real difference between Wang Feng, Ouyang Zhonghua, and Shi
Ge. They are there to demonstrate that solutions to our world’s problems
have to wait for virtuous elites to take action or, as in Shi Ge’s case, to have
pity on the masses. Similarly, these elites share another feature in imple-
menting their very different institutional designs, which is the use of ends
to justify means, even in the case of the most sympathetic Shi Ge. To safe-
guard the passage of Chinese refugees going westward via Central Asia, Shi
Ge orders the military to clear Xinjiang’s Muslim population in a ruthless
operation. Intriguingly, the incident is referred to in just two or three sen-
tences (p. 465, 476), with no detailed depictions as in cases involving other
heroes. With his more recent work on the Uyghur population in Xinjiang,
Wang Lixiong may have changed his view about how Shi Ge should solve
the problem. 
Last but not least, Yellow Peril was written when the CCP regime seemed
to be at its most precarious point in the PRC’s history. Despite quelling the
1989 Tiananmen protests to hold onto power, for almost three years until
Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour calling for greater reform in early 1992, the
Party appeared to be losing ground except for empirical reasons. That the
Party had given up any genuine ideological position can be seen in Deng’s
famous directive of “no more argument over Capital S (for socialism) versus
Capital C (for capitalism).” Perhaps because of this, Wang Lixiong does not
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take issue with China’s institutional setting or the Party’s claims to legiti-
macy. As seen earlier, he mainly questions modern democracy in the West
and green philosophy. Inevitably, these Western positions are presented only
in scattered sketches that leave Wang a weak interlocutor intellectually. It
is not an effective way to play up his own proposal, either. 
That said, we must recognise that Wang Lixiong was, and still is, firmly
against strong-man dictatorship or authoritarian Party rule. In the novel,
Wang Feng and Ouyang Zhonghua meet terrible ends as they are driven by
an excessive desire for political power. In contrast, Chen Pan turns to Shi
Ge precisely because of his qualities of being normal, humane, modest, and
understanding (p. 613), qualities that Wang Lixiong wants to inject into his
political design. He is determined to be on the side of true democracy for
ordinary people. The most interesting aspect of this novel, written in Com-
munist China in 1991, is that the contest between different models for hu-
manity’s future is not based on “inevitable outcomes” of predestined
historical paths as argued by the Communist camp in the Cold War years.
National dignity is confirmed, but it alone is considered insufficient to pro-
vide a future blueprint for humanity’s common welfare; nor is it the noblest
cause for people’s wholehearted devotion. In this respect, Yellow Peril re-
mains one of the most important works coming from post-socialist China. 
The Fat Years: Good Hell versus counterfeit
Paradise
Generally speaking, the narrative dynamic of Yellow Peril is anchored on
clashes between individuals or political forces, in curious contrast to the
genre tradition of utopian/dystopian literature, which is typically based on
a clash between conflicting ideas. (26) This is especially the case in dystopian
classics such as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), George Orwell’s
Nineteen Eighty-four (1949), and Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale
(1986). The dystopian world in these works is typically organised according
to a dominating ideological discourse that controls people’s way of life with
omnipresent, absolute authority. The few individuals who are not fully in-
culcated are isolated oddities and therefore the key narrative device for
questioning the dominant social order. The dystopian genre, in such cases,
pushes the “logic” of certain mainstream ideas in our daily reality to the
extreme to create a presumably non-realistic situation in which all social
life is organised strictly according to the logic of the ideas. In so doing, these
literary works are able to expose the absurdity of, and challenge the blind
spots potentially hidden in, the “logic” that already exists in our life. This is
basically the case with Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years, although with key
variations. 
Chan Koonchung is only one year older than Wang Lixiong, but they have
had very different life experiences. Born in Shanghai and growing up in Hong
Kong, Chan studied sociology at Hong Kong University, went on to Boston
University to study media, and returned to Hong Kong to work as a jour-
nalist in the mid seventies. The post-war baby boomers were coming of age
in a kind of political disorientation, unable to identify, as their parents did,
with either the CCP regime in Beijing or the KMT in Taipei. The British colo-
nial authority in Hong Kong was trying to pacify the social unrest of the
previous decade by emphasising services to local communities, but without
any substantial effort to contribute to a Hong Kong identity. Chan and a
few friends set up a new journal called (literally) Special Supplement
(Haowai 號外) to give a voice to the city they had grown up in and to their
own generation. Inspired by the counterculture movement of the sixties
and seventies in the West, which Chan had witnessed personally, they ex-
plicitly modelled the journal on New York City’s Village Voice. Haowai dis-
tinguished itself instantly by offering lengthy investigative reports on social
problems in the city, “camp”-style reviews, in-depth interviews, experimen-
tal literary works, and much more. Their poorly managed initial issues drew
interest instantly, and investment soon followed. The journal repackaged it-
self, changing its English name from The Tabloid to City Magazine. It has
since become one of the city’s cultural legends. (27)
Chan was City Magazine’s first Chief Editor and publisher, playing a crucial
role in determining its shape and style. However, he was not known as a
writer except for a single short story written in 1978. It would be another
20 years – reminiscent of Wang Lixiong’s two-decade gap between Yellow
Peril and Reincarnation – before Chan wrote his second story about Hong
Kong in 1998. By this time, the magazine had changed hands several times,
and Chan had moved away from the city, spending a few years on the main-
land in the early 1990s and then six years in Taiwan working for a cable tel-
evision station. He has been based in Beijing since 2000. In his own words,
political upheavals in the mainland and Taiwan in the post-war decades pro-
vided him with new perspectives on Hong Kong, reflected in the title to his
1998 novella, “Nothing Has Happened” (Shenme dou meiyou fasheng 什
麼都沒有發生). Under British rule, as a character in the novella comments,
“We are all conscripts of international capital in Hong Kong” (Women
doushi guoji ziben zai Xianggang de guyongbing 我們都是國際資本在香港
的雇傭兵) and nothing more. For his generation in Hong Kong, there was
none of the revolution, heroism, or sublime vision that has informed Wang
Lixiong’s literature. 
Living in Beijing as an outsider, Chan has produced several books on Hong
Kong’s socio-cultural reality and its political future, but not on mainland is-
sues. In interviews he explained that he had been mingling with leading cul-
tural figures in Beijing and Taipei before the new century, and in addition to
his old acquaintances, he got to know many leading intellectual dissidents
as well. Beijing’s cultural circles were bubbling with various issues at any
given moment, and an outsider had difficulty grasping enough to write
meaningful commentaries. Then events in 2008 made the overall picture
crystallised for him. It was still in mosaic-like form, so fiction was the best
choice to capture what was in his mind. He wrote The Fat Years as a re-
sult. (28)
The novel presents a slice of an imagined reality set in China in 2013,
three or four years away from its original publishing date. (29) The timing
makes it close to the present day, hastening the intended effect of being
familiar and absurd at the same time. It brings a notable difference from
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classical dystopian works as well. With numerous references to contempo-
rary events (e.g., the 2008 Beijing Olympics), the imagined state of affairs
is not as neatly organised as in, say, Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-four. In the
officially designated “China’s Golden Age of Ascendency,” the story goes,
almost everyone is experiencing “a small-small form of happiness,” dubbed
“High-Lite-Lite” (pp. 140-41), highlighted in English on the promotional gir-
dle of the Chinese version. Missing in this setting are two factors that read-
ers familiar with Huxley’s Brave New World might be expecting: on the one
hand a clearly spelt out, dominating ideology – that is, until to the very end
– and on the other a highly disciplined hierarchy issuing orders to members
of society with threats of swift punishment. 
Rule by fear, the archetypal evil against human liberation in typical
dystopian literature, is not present in its daily operational form in The Fat
Years, but rather in a bolt of lightning that precedes the novel’s present time
by two years. (30) Furthermore, fear is not directed at power exercised against
individual citizens but rather at potential social anarchy. The ruling power,
in turn, becomes the most desired saviour rescuing the masses from fearful
chaos. How this is possible becomes the main suspense of the narrative,
and the full answer does not reveal itself until late in the Epilogue (pp. 238-
52). The point is, when the ruling power struck two years ago, there were
many victims of its very swift and severe punishment. They were completely
forgotten by the public. Equally important is that the generally complacent
atmosphere prohibits individuals from raising unpleasant questions. These
two issues are threaded through the novel, leading to the final revelation,
which, as we shall see, does not provide solutions but poses challenging
questions for our time. 
The first half of the novel is narrated by several characters in the first-per-
son voice, mostly by a Taiwanese writer, Old Chen, who happens to also
have some roots in Hong Kong and now resides in Beijing (pp. 45-52), per-
haps a mirror image of the author himself. The other half is in third-person
voice, but again largely following Old Chen’s activities, making him the cen-
tre of the narrative structure. Old Chen’s narrative function is tri-fold. Firstly,
he is the main mediator in other people’s troubling obsession with the ab-
surdity of their living environment – specifically, two of Chen’s old acquain-
tances whom he has not seen for a long time. Secondly, his voice in Part
One and the third-person voice in Part Two provide, through various episode
details, a panoramic socioscape of the Chinese “Golden Age.” Thirdly, with-
out getting emotionally involved in the quandaries troubling his two friends
while neither of them has elaborated on the questions theoretically, Old
Chen’s ruminations appear to be notes on the thinking of his friends, but in
fact offer critical commentary on the situation and counter claims that tac-
itly support the existing order. Most importantly, in all of these functions,
particularly the second, the narrative maintains a laid-back style. Even when
discussing critical ideas, Old Chen sounds uncertain and reluctant to pursue
the issue at hand. In short, his position as protagonist never overshadows
the idealistic spirit of his two friends, who are the real hero and heroine of
the novel. 
The two friends are Fang Caodi, a China-born Chinese-American returning
to China to live, and Little Xi, a Beijing native who eventually embraces Old
Chen in a romantic relationship. The novel opens with Fang Caodi’s obser-
vation: “One whole month is missing” (p. 27). It is the month when the light-
ning bolt struck, during which Fang himself barely escaped while witnessing
chaotic scenes. It was immediately after that month that the government
announced with great fanfare the arrival of “China’s Golden Age of Ascen-
dency.” To erase people’s memory of terror, the authorities have removed
all possible records of that month. Fang has scavenged piles of bits of paper
as evidence, but no one seems to believe him or even cares to listen to him.
Fang’s crusade is against collective amnesia combined with government
censorship. Little Xi is a law school product, but she resigned from her en-
viable job as a judge 30 years ago in the 1983 “strike hard” (yan da 嚴打)
campaign that dealt out swift punishment against alleged social crimes.
She simply could not bring herself to aid the politically motivated execu-
tions of people without fair trial. However, she does not remember the miss-
ing month two years earlier, since she was in a mental hospital. When
released, she is shocked to find that no one wants to look at history or crit-
icise the authorities any longer. Her question is why we should give up in-
dependent thinking. She, too, has “[thrown] herself into solitary combat” 
(p. 222). Her battle is against conformism and compliance. 
The pair’s crusading spirit is in contrast but also complimentary to Old
Chen’s semi-detached air in the narrative. Old Chen and Fang Caodi, with
their non-PRC identities, are outsiders not fully assimilated into the local
order. Little Xi, meanwhile, is a voluntary internal exile further marginalised
by the fact that plainclothes police are constantly following her due to her
postings on the Internet through frequently changing accounts. Their odd
position vis-à-vis society at large sharpens the novel’s dystopian edge.
Meanwhile, the spirit exhibited by Fang Caodi and Little Xi is not sceptical
ambiguity but determined defiance. These are not ambitious heroes des-
tined to change the course of history, like those in Yellow Peril. Instead, they
are standing alone and “radically idealistic” (pp. 221-22). At the beginning
of the Epilogue, when the two finally meet, their case is explained in a his-
torical account: 
Hundreds of millions of Chinese lived through an age that witnessed
a storm of idealism and were baptised in that flood of idealism. Even
though later on their ideals turned to nightmares and disillusion-
ment, and an entire generation of people lost their ideals, still they
didn’t abandon idealism. 
Fang Caodi and Little Xi had grown up in that turbulent era. (p. 214)
More importantly, Little Xi has learned to argue anonymously but tirelessly
on the Internet, with clarity and lucidity, about steadfastly looking at his-
torical truth and fighting for justice (pp. 222-23). 
We are not told the contents of her postings, but there is a curious inver-
sion of some more familiar dystopian settings: the marginalised figure is
holding up clarified ideas while the dominating order is extremely vague
and evasive in its political discourse. The light-hearted vagueness is pre-
sented in the panoramic portrayal of a society permeated by ecstasy over
China’s rise, as Old Chen mingles with the cultural elite, urban socialites,
and successful business people with political connections who dominate
mainstream discourse. It lends satire to the novel with numerous barely
concealed references to social phenomena in contemporary China. Supple-
menting this is a rural-based episode in the second part. Even there, straight-
jacket-style top-down thought control is replaced by more sophisticated
manoeuvres. Parallel to college students informing on liberal-minded pro-
fessors in the city (pp. 87-88), pastors purposely lead religious prayers that
steer followers’ minds away from demands for social justice (p. 202; 
pp. 206-9). 
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The hypocrisy of society is best captured in a proposal of ten policy sug-
gestions: 
a one party democratic dictatorship;
the rule of law with stability as the most important element;
an authoritarian government that governs for the people; 
a state-controlled market economy;
fair competition guaranteed by state-owned enterprises; 
scientific development with unique Chinese characteristics; 
a self-centered harmonious foreign policy; 
a multi-ethnic republic ruled by one sovereign ethnic group of Han
Chinese;
post-Westernism and post-universalism as the nation’s chief world
views;
the restoration of Chinese national culture as the world’s unrivalled
leader. (pp. 146-47)
Proposed by a founding editor of China’s leading intellectual publication,
the Reading Journal (Dushu 讀書), these items have all become “firmly es-
tablished principles,” and the editor has been officially recognised for his
contribution to China’s New Era of Prosperity (pp. 146-47). With twists con-
cerning China’s reality, these statements echo George Orwell’s famous line
in Animal Farm: “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal
than others.” The difference is that The Fat Years is not concerned with
demonstrating how such absurd principles are put into social practice. Its
focus is on the solitary battles fought by our relatively isolated protagonists
to retain the possibility of serious intellectual engagement in public life, in-
cluding, but not limited to, being truthful about collective history.
In fact, by threading battles against collective amnesia and conformist
compliance throughout the novel, the author has apparently omitted or
downplayed some very dark aspects of Chinese society today. (31) The only
violent incident directly depicted is committed against a peasant migrant
worker in the city by a group of ultra-nationalist college students. Every
time Little Xi appears in Beijing, we are told in some way that she has been
followed. But the security agents never come to the fore. The emphasis is
always somewhere else, drawing our attention away from state-sanctioned
violence in people’s daily lives. Even when the story shifts to the country-
side, where peasants are agitating over a land seizure, the incident is relayed
through layers of remove, and the raw emotion of the abused is not seen.
This is not a political novel of exposure. It is about valuing independent
thinking and ideas. 
The most obvious clash of ideas occurs in the Epilogue, which gives He
Dongsheng, a high-ranking official, a conspicuous opportunity to make his
case on behalf of the regime. He admits that our heroes’ suspicion is justi-
fied. When China was hit by economic crisis two years earlier, the state de-
liberately stood by and let society descend into complete anarchy for a
whole week, “what Thomas Hobbes called ‘the war of all against all’” 
(p. 250), to pave the way for a three-week long “severe and rapid” crack-
down that established the Chinese Leviathan as the sole guarantor of social
order. However, He says, it would be cheap sympathy to cry out against the
injustice suffered by victims of the campaign. Stability under the state of
absolute prestige is but the means and “not the ultimate goal – we need
stability in order to accomplish great things” (p. 252). To secure the total
success of the whole project, the government immediately announced the
arrival of China’s Golden Age of Ascendency and at the same time started
adding a certain chemical substance to the water supply nationwide, which
has induced a universal “high lite-lite” state in most people. Fang Caodi and
Little Xi, along with scattered others, are not affected, because they are tak-
ing medication for asthma and depression, and because they are intellec-
tually independent and inherently resistant to thought control. Where He
Dongsheng’s story shocked the protagonists most is about the missing
month. It is the Chinese people themselves who have opted to forget it,
providing the best opportunity for the Central Propaganda organs to do
their censorship work. Otherwise, He says, “we could not have forced” peo-
ple to forget (pp. 295-97). This depressing revelation ends the story, but it
is not the end of the questions raised by the novel. 
According to He Dongsheng, the “great things” to be accomplished by the
Leviathan State are primarily five policy measures, all from a central-left
position to the extent that at one point, “Little Xi and Fang Caodi nodded
in agreement” (p. 262). Here the author pushes his “logic” again to leave
the government a clean record in running its business after the hard strike,
which is far from the corruption-laden Party-state of today’s reality. The
question becomes two-fold. First, should a government be forgiven for cov-
ering up its bloody past so long as it adopts optimal policies for the people?
Second, should the public openly scrutinise and debate official decisions
when the government has adopted the best possible policies embodying
economic social justice? The protagonists and He cannot mend their dis-
agreement over the answers to this socio-ethical dilemma, which is a cen-
tral issue in the book. In previous chapters, it takes the form of contrasting
a good Hell with a counterfeit Paradise. (32)
“In a good hell,” we are told, “people are aware that they are living in hell
and so they want to transform it, but after living for a long time in a fake
paradise, people become accustomed to it and they actually believe that
they are already in paradise” (p. 161). In John Milton’s Paradise Lost, a par-
adise is understood to be part of what defines the human condition and
lends meaning to human existence. The problem with a counterfeit paradise
is that it is based on lies and erasure of collective memory. People living
there are not really innocent but accommodate oppressive pressures out
of fear for their own safety and potential material prosperity. An idealist
who insists on seeking truth and preserving memory, Little Xi embodies the
strongest conflict with the fake version of paradise on earth that she finds
China has become. She fights for social justice that is also directly threat-
ened by the conformist nature of the fake paradise. He Dongsheng’s an-
swers, to her understanding, are essentially a developmental logic that
unfortunately has become rampant worldwide today. Little Xi seems to lose
the battle in her confrontation with He, but the issues lingering in the
reader’s mind keep her resistance alive as one of the best possible manifes-
tations of true human spirit. 
With rich textual references and lengthy discussions by its characters on
policy and political and historical issues, The Fat Years appears to keep its
central questions one step away from being fully explicated until the very
end. Yet, the seemingly pessimistic ending, when the main characters can
make personal choices only by leaving the social setting that has excited
their public concerns, forces the reader to reflect further on historical mem-
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ory, the freedom to think independently about public issues, and so forth,
against the dominating discourse that values economic issues over every-
thing else. 
Conclusion
In less than half a century, the world has moved from worrying about ex-
hausting Earth’s natural resources to universally hailing infinite growth. This
period covers China’s Reform Era since the late 1970s. The Chinese experi-
ence is therefore integral to global concerns, and in its latter manifestation,
possibly part of the cause of global problems. These years are important
also in terms of the rising technological economy that has been changing
our living experience in significant ways. New technologies, or new ideas
about future potential, rapidly rushed into Chinese translation once the
country re-opened her doors to the outside world in the 1980s. 
Wang Lixiong’s Yellow Peril and Chan Koonchung’s The Fat Years, two
imaginative utopian-dystopian novels, respond not only to China’s domestic
political issues, but also to their worldwide implications. The books are nev-
ertheless distinctly different in style, focus, and theme. We mentioned dra-
matic scenes in Yellow Peril. In contrast, The Fat Years adopts a subdued
tone, even when very dramatic events are occurring, such as the kidnapping
episode that leads to the epilogue. 
The different styles are directly related to how the two novels incorporate
elements of science fiction into their respective narratives. Wang Lixiong’s
continuing fascination with scientific ideas and new technology provides a
key solution in Yellow Peril to the final, primitive utopian collective in the
form of an artificially produced potato-like foodstuff invented by the
woman scientist Chen Pan. (33) More importantly, the author’s fascination is
almost tangible when he gives the detailed layout of a nuclear submarine,
describes with minute precision an assassin’s preparation work, or narrates
a large-scale military confrontation in a complex geographical setting.
Chan’s The Fat Years, on the other hand, sets up suspense through techno-
logical manipulation – an officially developed drug being secretly added to
the drinking water supply to keep the general populace constantly content
– only to dismiss it at the end as making no contribution at all to people’s
forgetfulness, which is voluntary especially in respect to unpleasant histor-
ical events.
Curiously, some basic themes in Yellow Peril are also seen in a number of
contemporary science fiction works from China. For one thing, civilisation
is extremely fragile in such works if we consider how easy cannibalism
comes about as a “natural” consequence when survival becomes the top
priority. Related to this is the concept of the constant threat of scarcity of
resources. Unlike some recent works in which scarcity of resources becomes
a source of international confrontation, in Wang Lixiong’s work it remains
the root cause of crisis for all humanity. Wang’s concern in Yellow Peril is
not nationalistic at all. When Chinese refugees bring the gradational election
scheme to other parts of the world, it is not presented as China’s triumph
as the ultimate saviour of mankind, but instead offers mankind a precious
opportunity to reflect on the purpose of people living together as a soci-
ety. (34)
Chan Koonchung does not share Wang’s anxiety over such themes. His
dystopian construction is on the surface much closer to its Western cousins
than most contemporary Chinese writers of either dystopian or science fic-
tion. Meanwhile, Chan does not construct his dystopian world as a criticism
against humanity’s presumptuous usurpation of God’s work. Instead, at
times The Fat Years pays homage to Lu Xun, modern China’s greatest writer,
in particular to his idea that the masses and society are all responsible for
killing individual independence and suffocating intellectual creativity. It is
difficult to say that the thematic difference between Yellow Peril and The
Fat Years are due to the authors’ different backgrounds – from the mainland,
or from outside of it. In both cases, pessimistically speaking, we may have
plenty of opportunities to read more nightmarish dystopian stories coming
from China as a rising superpower. 
z Chaohua Wang is an independent scholar, based in Los Angeles,
California. (wangc@humnet.ucla.edu).
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33. I am grateful to be reminded this point by one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper. 
34. This is the view of Henry Y. H. Zhao, who implies that Wang Lixiong in this novel demonstrates
the usual mindset among Chinese writers of worrying about China. Henry Y. H. Zhao, “A Fearful
Symmetry,” art. cit., pp. 461-62, 469-471. I disagree with this view.
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